Recent studies have demonstrated subadditivity of human probability judgment: the judged probabilities for an event partition sum to more than 1. We report conditions under which people's probability judgments are superadditive instead: the component judgments for a partition sum to less than 1. We i n terpret both directions of deviation from additivity in a common framework, in which probability judgments are often mediated by judgments of evidence. The two kinds of nonadditivity result from di erences in recruitment of supporting evidence together with reduced processing of nonfocal propositions.
Introduction
Suppose that an event E has been partitioned into two or more mutually exclusive subevents, and that probability assessments are made for E and for each of these subevents. The assessments are said to be additive if the probability assigned to E is approximately equal to the sum of the probabilities of the subevents. They are subadditive if the probability assigned to E falls short of the subevent sum, and superadditive if the assignment t o E exceeds the subevent sum. Superadditivity is a feature of Shafer's theory of evidence Shafer, 1976 , and has been found previously for evidence judgments Briggs and Krantz, 1992 but not for probability judgments. Subadditive probability judgment has been widely reported in the literature, and helped to motivate Support Theory Rottenstreich and Tversky, 1997; Tversky and Koehler, 1994 . The purpose of the present note is to document the existence of superadditive probability judgment in special conditions. Our ndings suggest modi cations of Support Theory.
Tversky and his colleagues pointed out that subadditivity is common in both nonexpert and expert probability judgments. In a dramatic example Redelmeier et al., 1995, physicians were asked to provide probabilities for the following events, with respect to a particular hospitalized patient whose case had been summarized to them: a. dies during the present hospital admission, b. discharged alive but dies within 1 year, c. lives more than 1 but less than 10 years, d. lives more than 10 years.
Since the four events are exhaustive, additivity e n tails that their probabilities sum to 1. Each o f 52 physicians assessed the probability of exactly one of the four outcomes a d, randomly assigned to him or her. Under these conditions, the mean judgments of the four component probabilities summed to 1.64, which implies that many of the physicians' assessments were too high.
An appealing explanation for subadditivity w as introduced in a seminal paper Fischho et al., 1978, and elaborated in Support Theory Tversky and Koehler, 1994; Rottenstreich and Tversky, 1997 . It assumes rst that explicit details in a description A of an event provide cues that lead to recruitment of evidence or support for the occurrence of that event. To illustrate, consider a doctor who is asked to evaluate the probability of a, above. The description dies during the present hospital admission" suggests ways in which death could occur in the short term.
In contrast, its implicit negation, does not die during the present hospital admission" lacks the details that would be contained in the explicit disjunction of the components b d. To complete this explanation, one further assumes that probability is usually assessed by weighing the evidence that comes to mind for and against a given proposition. This is expressed by the Here, A and B are two descriptions that are understood to bemutually exclusive, and PA; B is the judged probability o f A, when the alternative to A is B. Subadditivity then results from the excess of evidence that is recruited in favor of each description A of a component subevent of a partition, when it serves as the focus, compared with the evidence for its implicit and underdescribed negation B = ,A. This also explains why subadditivity can be reduced or absent when the partition consists only, or principally, o f t wo complementary and symmetrically described In the initial presentations of Support Theory, this last property, called binary complementarity, was raised to the status of an axiom. The existing evidence Tversky and Koehler, 1994; Wallsten et al., 1992 was consistent with this axiom. It would be very much in the spirit of the theory, h o wever, to postulate that additivity for complementary subevents depends on functional symmetry in the descriptions, as noted above. A generalization of support theory, in which binary complementarity is no longer an axiom, needs to be developed.
One purpose of this note is to underline the need for generalization by showing that additivity can fail for binary partitions. A more important purpose is to document deviations in the direction of superadditivity when evidence is weak for both A 1 and A 2 . This is a new empirical nding, 1 one that suggests complexities in the relationship between evidence and probability judgments.
We suggest that superadditivity should be observed when the recruitment of evidence for each 1 One of the reviewers called our attention to the fact that superadditivity has been found under some conditions in children's judgments of frequency of success or failure in a skill task Cohen et al., 1956 . However, aspects of the method used in this pioneering study make the ndings di cult to interpret, and they may not be related to the prediction we test here.
isolated subevent fails to uncover much support and when the contrary description is not processed equally. Consider, for example, the assertion that the 1995 birth rate in Burma was greater than that in Thailand. A person who knows little about such things may nd no clear reason to believe this assertion, and may t h us judge its support to be weak. The weak support might f a vor a l o w assessment of probability, despite the fact that the contrary proposition | namely, the Thai birth rate exceeeds the Burmese | also recruits little evidence. The low assessment w ould result from the implicit character of the contrary proposition; since it is not formulated explicitly, the judge may fail to recognize that it, too, has little support.
In the preceding example, the exhaustive partition elements are: a Thailand had greater 1995 birth rate than Burma; b Burma had greater 1995 birth rate than Thailand; and c the birth rates were identical. If a and b are each judged to have l o w probability, and c is judged to have probability zero, the result is superadditivity.
This prediction of superadditivity does not appear to have been tested empirically. Such w as the purpose of the experiment w e n o w describe.
Experiment
On the basis of pilot testing we constructed four ternary partitions, shown in Table 1 . It was assumed that virtually everyone recognizes the three statements of a given partition to be exhaustive and mutually exclusive. It was also assumed that the credibility of the =-statement of each partition was close to zero for our respondents, but as a precaution it was explicitly set to zero to the -statements and the reversed -statements were as follows.
-question: The freezing point of gasoline is not equal to that of alcohol. What is the probability that the freezing point of gasoline is greater than that of alcohol?
Probability:
reversed -question: The freezing point of alcohol is not equal to that of gasoline. What is the probability that the freezing point of alcohol is greater than that of gasoline? Probability:
While the focal proposition varies in these two questions, they are syntactically parallel in all respects. The content of the questions was designed to provoke considerable, but not total uncertainty in the minds of our respondents, and to be associated with few reasons for believing either the -statement or its reversed variant. The four partitions, each with two distinct possible focal propositions, give rise to eight questions.
The eight questions were translated into Italian and administered to 80 university students in introductory psychology classes in Milan and Padua. Each student received four questions, namely: for each partition, either the -question or its reversed variant but not both. The latter choice as well as the order of the four questions were individually randomized under the restriction that exactly 40 students respond to each of the eight questions. The questions prepared for a given student were printed on a single page and administered in a group setting with no time pressure. Instructions to students emphasized that the questions do not call for a Yes No answer but rather a percentage representing probability; answers of 0 and 1 were to beentered only in case of certainty.
We subsequently performed an exact replication of the experiment, using a di erent sample of 80 students from the same population. Finally, to determine the impact of the leading inequality statement in each question, we performed a control experiment with a new group of 80 students.
The control was identical to the preceding studies except that the rst sentence was removed from all questions.
Results
Figure 1 presents a histogram of all 960 probability judgments collected in our three experiments.
About 34 of the responses were :50, most likely re ecting the cultural convention whereby 50-50" represents ignorance; most of the remaining responses were distributed over the other ten multiples of :10. The large numberof:50 responses evidently re ects the subjects' impression of weak evidence, but in a fashion that tends toward additivity for these partitions. In particular, analysis of median responses is unrevealing: because of the lump at 50-50", the median response in each study was :50. Superadditivity can nonetheless occur if many subjects generate low probabilities in response to statements for which they have little evidence, rather than using the conventional 50-50." The asymmetry between the left and right ends of Figure 1 suggests that this was indeed the case. Table 2 documents this asymmetry, comparing responses at :10 or lower with those at :90 or higher. The table shows that extreme low responses occurred at least twice as often as correspondingly extreme high ones. This pattern was also re ected in the mean probability judgments, which w ere :423 in the original experiment, :466 in the replication, and :451 in the control. Since these means represent the responses to both directions in each partition, they demonstrate substantial superadditivity. Deviations from the hypothesis of :50 or more predicted by additivity or subadditivity are statistically reliable for each experiment p : 01 by one-tailed t-test, N = 80. It is interesting that little or no asymmetry is observed when comparing response intervals :3; : 4 versus :6; : 7 . The superadditivity of mean judgments is thus based on responses at the extremes, especially those at or beyond :10 and :90.
The null hypothesis of symmetry between low and high responses should not be tested by a chi-square or binomial test based on Table 2 , since the data include up to 4 responses per subject, making independence assumptions suspect. Instead, we categorized subjects according to their overall judgment pro les: low for respondents who gave one or more responses at :10 or below, but none as high as :90, versus high for respondents who showed the reverse pro le. As shown in Table 3 , the former outnumber the latter approximately three to one, and the null hypothesis of symmetry can be rejected in each experiment.
Analysis of the four partitions taken separately supports the conclusion of superadditive judgment. Table 4 shows the means and standard deviations for the eight questions in each experiment. In every case the sum of the answers given to the -and reversed -questions in the same partition sum to less than 1.
We note that the magnitude of superadditivity seen in Table 4 about 10 is less than the magnitude of subadditivity reported Redelmeier et al., 1995; Tversky and Koehler, 1994 for partitions of 3 or 4 components around 50. We attribute this at least in part to the subjects' mixed response strategies: absence of evidence is sometimes expressed as a response of :50 and sometimes as a response near 0.
Restoring symmetry
As explained in the introductory section, our prediction of superadditivity assumes that judges fail to recognize the extent to which non-focal components of a partition also have slight support. To examine this assumption directly we replicated the rst experiment but added a reminder about the alternative e v ent. Illustrating with the rst partition, the new questions were as follows.
-question: The freezing point of gasoline is not equal to that of alcohol. Thus, either the freezing point of gasoline is greater than that of alcohol, or the freezing point of alcohol is greater than that of gasoline. What is the probability that the freezing point of gasoline is greater than that of alcohol?
reversed -question: The freezing point of alcohol is not equal to that of gasoline. Thus, either the freezing point of alcohol is greater than that of gasoline, or the freezing point o f gasoline is greater than that of alcohol. What is the probability that the freezing point o f alcohol is greater than that of gasoline?
The responses to this version of the questions were highly additive: the 90-con dence interval for the mean of the subjects' average probability judgment i s :503 :029. The last part of Table   4 shows the means and standard deviations for each partition.
This result suggests that asymmetry of processing the focal proposition and its contrary plays an important role in superadditivity. When subjects are reminded of the contrary, their probability judgments tend to be normalized, and hence more nearly additive, as postulated by Support Theory. Observe that our ndings are consistent with the clear intuition that additivity will result from having the same person assess the probabilities of all components of a given partition. On the other hand, they are inconsistent with a model that maps low evidence directly into low probability.
Discussion
The simple experiments reported here establish one set of conditions leading to superadditive probability judgments: low level of knowledge about the questions that are posed, together with asymmetric processing of a description and its negation. 2 Yuval Rottenstreich personal communication, September1997 has also pointed out that the mechanism suggested here predicts subadditivity for binary partitions when a high level of knowledge is combined with asymmetric processing. Experiments currently in progress by Chen, Krantz, Osherson and Bonini indicate this to be the case.
Previous studies of probability judgment for binary partitions have reported additivity. Three possible explanations should be mentioned. First, some or all of these studies may not have satis ed the set of conditions just described. Second, some studied may have used medians as measures of the central tendency of probability judgments. The predominance of 50 responses see Figure 1 could produce additivity: if our data were summarized by medians rather than means, additivity w ould bewidespread in the item analysis of Table 4 . As Figure 1 shows, the median is not a good descriptor of the distribution for probability judgments. Finally, the major study supporting additivity Wallsten et al., 1992 used subjects who made many probability judgments, including both of the complementary descriptions at one time or another during their task. This could lead subjects to consider the implicit negation more systematically, as in the 2 Another set of conditions that produces superadditivity Rottenstreich and Brenner, 1996 arises when one of the descriptions is an explicit disjunction that can easily be repacked" into a single, less detailed description. The greater attention in focal processing makes such repacking more probable, and thus can reduce the evidence recruited for the disjunction, compared to the evidence recruited when the disjunction is salient but is not the judgmental target.
nal experiment a b o ve. Support Theory Rottenstreich and Tversky, 1997; Tversky and Koehler, 1994 involves two psychological insights: that probability judgments for propositions are mediated by the strength of evidence recruited by the descriptions of those propositions, and that the mapping onto a scale from 0 to 1 involves normalization of evidence strength, well approximated by Equation 1. It seems quite in the spirit of that theory to assume that recruitment of evidence can be di erent, depending on whether or not the description is explicitly presented and whether or not it is the target for the probability judgment. Such asymmetry between explicit target descriptions and others can occur even where the partition is essentially binary. Our results can thus beviewed as compatible with the basic insights of Support Theory, though not with its formal statement.
Development of a suitable modi cation of the theory represents an important c hallenge. Note. For each cell, N = 40. -mean is the sum of the two means in the corresponding row. 
